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Abstract
Do ‘home-biased’ residential real estate investors purchase and perform
differently than those investors who look for opportunities further away? We
identify a large sample of investors in the residential property market and
measure the proximity of their purchase from their existing residential loca-
tion. It is hypothesised that, in line with the results of home bias in other
investment markets such as equities, there is a preference among residential
real estate investors to buy locally and that this bias affects their returns.
The home bias can be used to optimise housing market lending criteria and
to inform housing investment policy. It should also be considered in household
portfolio allocation decisions and has broad implications for how psychology
affects financial decision-making.
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1 Introduction
When buying a new house, individuals exhibit a preference for properties that are
geographically close to their current address. Lower search costs, limits to mobil-
ity and familiarity may explain this phenomenon for owner-occupiers. However, a
similar trend is observed for property investors: investment properties are typically
purchased in the same area as the investor’s own residence. This result is surprising
given the foregone potential for diversification benefit and the relatively minimal
search costs and mobility restrictions of investors. It also potentially exaggerates
property investment concentration risks.
We explore this issue by analyzing the extent to which property investors in Aus-
tralia prefer local real estate and examine several factors that explain this preference.
Residential real estate investors in Australia are a large and growing segment of the
housing market. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) estimates that investors
account for around 26 percent of residential real estate holdings.1 Furthermore,
there are concerns that increases in residential property investment increase risks to
financial stability.2 Our research presents timely information that may be used by
regulators and lenders to better manage these risks.
The prior empirical research into the drivers of property location preference
among investors is limited. While Goetzmann (1993) demonstrates the significant
risk reduction to property investment portfolios from geographic diversification. re-
mains a mystery that investors are not diversified? but advice not followed?. An-
other strand of research focuses on the price effects of being a local buyer. For
1’Submission to the Financial System Inquiry,’ Reserve Bank of Australia, March
2014. http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/submissions/financial-sector/financial-system-inquiry-
2014-03/pdf/financial-system-inquiry-2014-03.pdf
2’Financial Stability Review,’ Reserve Bank of Australia, October 2017
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example, Lambson et al (2004) find that non-local apartment buyers pay a premium
relative to local buyers. They attribute this to non-locals’ higher marginal search
costs, higher information asymmetry, and behavioral biases. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock
(2012) attribute the non-local premium to the relatively stronger bargaining power
of local buyers. We extend the literature by considering the factors driving the
preference for local real estate. Specifically, we demonstrate a link between prop-
erty investors’ location familiarity, sophistication and relative purchasing power, and
their propensity to invest locally. To the best of our knowledge, we are also first to
analyse property investors’ location preferences in Australia.
We obtain a large, proprietary sample of residential property mortgage loan ap-
plications across Australia. The data sample comprises borrowers’ characteristics
including their current postcode, as well as the postcode of the newly property pur-
chased. This allows identification of local and non-local buyers. We are also able
to distinguish between borrowers who are owner-occupiers (mortgage applicants
purchasing a property to reside in the property) and property investors (mortgage
applicants purchasing a property to rent the property to a third-party tenant or to
resell it). This is an important delineation. Owner-occupiers have lower spatial mo-
bility than investors, due to personal situations such as employment, education and
community connections. To avoid these confounding factors, our analysis focuses on
the preferences of property investors.
We show that 68 percent of residential property investor purchases are local.
That is, over two-thirds of investment properties are purchased in the locality in
which the investor resides. Our results indicate that greater familiarity with an
area, proxied by longer tenure at their current address and employment, increase
the marginal investor’s propensity to purchase locally. Further, we find that investor
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sophistication has a mitigating effect on the preference for local property, reflecting
increased awareness of the benefits of geographic diversification.
We explore possible rational explanations for investors’ local property prefer-
ences. Following Clauretie and Thistle (2007) we test whether strong price appre-
ciation in a buyer’s current market gives them a purchasing power advantage in
non-local markets. Contrasting with their results, we find investors are more likely
to purchase locally when their local market has outperformed. In other words, they
do not appear to use their greater purchasing power. We attribute this to possible
momentum-chasing behavior and evidence of behavioral biases influencing residen-
tial real estate.
Residential real estate presents an interesting setting for behavioral economics
research. Residential property is the largest financial decision, consumption good
and concentration of wealth for most individuals; Flavin and Yamashita (2002). It
should arguably follow that residential property purchase decisions are exercised
with above average diligence. However, the presence of behavioral biases in the
market is widely acknowledged. To explain the persistence of behavioral biases in
residential real estate, Salzman and Zwinkels (2013) suggest that, ‘...Although many
theoretical and empirical studies stress the presence and importance of behavioral
biases, the awareness of cognitive limitations in the housing market is not wide
spread...’ (p.15). Our results may also relate to the well-document ’home bias’ in
equities markets. The equity market home bias refers to the observation of stock
portfolios that excessively weight domestic securities over international securities
(French and Poterba (1991)), and locally headquartered companies over companies
with distantly located headquarters (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)). At first glance,
our results appear to demonstrate the extension of a home bias to residential real
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estate. However, issues with using home bias short.
There are important implications of this research for housing market lending
practice and regulation. The size of Australia’s housing market and its intercon-
nectedness to the financial system through bank lending channels links make it a
potential source of systemic risk. Housing debt in Australia is disproportionately
held by residential real estate investors, who are less incentivised to reduce their
mortgage loan-to-value ratio,3 and consequently at greater risk of negative equity
events (RBA, 2014). Geographically concentrated investor markets resulting from
the home bias could exacerbate this effect. The current research provides a platform
for future research into this line of inquiry.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the
home bias literature as it relates to both financial and real estate markets, and derive
a set of hypotheses. In section 3 the research design and methodology are outlined.
Section 4 describes the data sources and presents summary statistics. Section 5
presents the results of our analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
A broad theoretical and empirical literature examines the effect of local and non-
local buyers on residential real estate prices. Theoretical models show that the
costs associated with a property purchase are positively related to the geographical
distance between the buyers current and prospective property. (Turnbull and Sir-
3This is due to the tax incentives in place in Australia for negative gearing and, to a lesser
extent, discounts in capital gains; see .
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mans), (Lambson et al). These costs primarily arise through higher search costs and
asymmetric information for non-locals. Consequently, models relating buyer char-
acteristics with property purchase prices predict that non-local buyers are relatively
disadvantaged relative to local buyers.
In a study of commercial, multi-family apartment building transactions, Lamb-
son et al. (2004) identify that geographically distant buyers pay, on average, 5.52
percent more than geographically proximate buyers.4 The out-of-state buyer price
premium is supported in studies by Chinloy et al. (2013) and Clauretie and Thistle
(2007). Ling et al. (2016) demonstrate that buyer distance from property, whether
in- or out-of-state, is positively linked to the transaction price, while earlier research
by Miller et al. (1988) finds a significance price premium in purchases of single-family
residential homes in Hawaii by Japanese investors from January 1986 to February
1988.
Chinloy et al (2013) make the distinction between local and non-local property
buyers to assess the effect of local experience on purchase price. They find that the
subset of experienced local investors, those with repeated transations in the same
market, achieve purchase price discounts while inexperienced locals do not. Using
data for the Atlanta housing market, Chinloy et al (@013) show that this experience-
driven price discount is more important in explaining local and non-local differences
than marginal search costs. These results indicate that the delineation of local and
non-local buyers in prior studies is incomplete, and that heterogeneity among locals
should be considered.
While these past studies show a price effect based on the buyer’s relative dis-
tance to the property, the results are potentially limited by the various endogeneity
4Their sample covers sales in Phoenix from 1990 to 2002 that consists of approximately equal
numbers of in-state (1,415) buyers and out-of-state (1,439) buyers.
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problems that arises. For example, omitted variable bias arises if non-local buyers
systematically prefer to purchase higher quality homes, where underlying quality
is unobserved. Due to data limitations, even the most advanced hedonic model
specification will fail to capture the true quality of a property.
Ihlanfeldt and Mayock attempt to address potential endogeneity arising from cor-
related omitted variables by comparing tax-assessed property value estimates with
purchase prices. They argue that this variable is more strongly captures differences
in housing quality.
there is also the issue of simultaneity, or reverse causality. buyers which expect
to benefit more, are more likely to be influenced in this way in their decision to buy
locally or non-locally.
In the present study, we expand the literature by considering how additional
factors explain the property buyers’ decision to invest locally or non-locally.
Further, the relative bargaining power of the buyer and seller, assuming no in-
formational assymmetry, may explain the home bias. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012)
argue that in a thin market, such as real estate, distant buyers are in a weak posi-
tion to local sellers. They empirically demonstrate, using a large sample of Florida
housing transactions, a positive relationship between sale price and the distance of
the buyers new home from their previous home.
An alternative explanation for home bias comes from the behavioral economics
literature and attributes investor preferences for local assets to familiarity; Kilka
and Weber (2000) and Fellner-Ro¨hling and Maciejovsky (2003). Familiarity bias
leads to overconfidence in beliefs about known situations, and under-estimation of
risks. This is partly demonstrated in the estimation of investors expected domestic
market returns in each of the countries studied by French and Poterba (1991), which
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yields a relative optimism (pessimism) towards securities in the domestic (foreign)
market. Seiler et al. (2013) and Seiler et al. (2008) present survey evidence of real
estate owners that supports the presence of familiarity bias.
Our first hypothesis conjectures that those investors that are less mobile are more
likely to exhibit home bias due to familiarity. We predict a negative relationship
between mobility and home bias. Investors that move more, and are more exposed
to different markets, are more likely to invest non-locally.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). More mobile investors are more likely to invest non-locally
than less mobile investors.
Our second hypothesis expects that investor sophistication is negatively linked
to the likelihood of a home bias in real estate purchases. More sophisticated in-
vestors have more experience and knowledge, and for that reason that may exploit
a relatively stronger bargaining power and hold asymmetrical information for their
advantage.
Part of the home bias literature also considers the role of investor sophistication.
In equity markets it is shown that ‘sophisticated’ investors outperform less sophis-
ticated investors; Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). Graham et al. (2009) and Bose
et al. (2015) demonstrate that the persistence of the home bias in equities markets
is linked to investor education levels, while investor sophistication is shown to limit
the impact of the home bias in equity markets; Karlsson and Norde´n (2007) and
Kimball and Shumway (2010). More sophisticated real estate investors may value a
geographically diversified portfolio higher than non-sophisticated investors and may
exhibit less home bias. In addition, more sophisticated investors may hold more
information and have higher bargaining power due to their additional knowledge
and experience.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2). More sophisticated investors are more likely to invest non-
locally than less sophisticated investors.
Our third hypothesis considers a possible rational explanation for investors’ de-
cisions to purchase locally or non-locally, based on the relative performance of their
current address housing market. If an investor’s home property market has out-
performed, they will have higher purchasing power in property markets that have
underperformed relatively.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Property investors have a lower propensity to purchase prop-
erties in the same locality as their current address when their current real estate
market has outperformed.
Support for this hypothesis would suggest that observed home bias may not be
driven purely by behavioural biases, since it may result from investors being ”priced
out” of non-local markets due to poor price performance in their home market.
An alternative view on this position is that investors in an outperforming market
have ”anchored” their price expectations higher than prevailing prices in relatively
underperforming markets. Viewing the underperforming markets as cheap, they are
more motivated to buy non-locally. We thus consider whether relative purchasing
power can explain local and non-local property purchases. This argument is explored
by Lambson et al. (2004) though the results are inconclusive.
We don’t believe institutional barriers or incentives are important explanators
of the residential real estate home bias for different regions within a country. The
following section outlines the research design we take to test these hypotheses.
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3 Research Design
In order to explore home bias, we must first define local and non-local property
buyers. To make this distinction we determine whether the property buyer’s postal
address at the time of the mortgage application and the postal address of the prop-
erty being purchased with the mortgage are in the same locality.5 In this research,
locality is determined by whether the Statistical Local Area (SLA) of the property
purchased with the mortgage is the same as the SLA of the residential address of
the mortgage applicant.6
To explore H1, we utilise the RIPL sample of mortgage applicants. We consider
the following binary model for non-local housing purchases, where the mortgage
borrower chooses to buy property locally or not. We assume that yi = 1 if mort-
gage RIPL applicant i chooses to buy non-locally (in a different SLA) and yi = 0
otherwise. We are interested in estimating the conditional probability of buying
non-local housing property, P(yi = 1 | Ii), as well as the determinants of this prob-
ability; where Ii is the information set at mortgage application time that contains
market variables, borrower characteristics, and property characteristics. Specifically,
we consider the Logit model of the form,
P(yi = 1 | Ii) = Λ(α +X ′iβ +W ′iγ + Z ′iδ) (1)
5In our study, we assume that the property market to which an individual is ’home biased’ is
the locality in which they currently reside. It could be argued that individuals also have some
knowledge of areas in which they work, or socialise. Due to data limitations, consideration of these
alternatives is beyond the scope of this study.
6We use ABS SLA4 2011 http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/1259.
0.30.001July%202011?OpenDocument. For robustness, we also perform our analysis using post-
codes and states and territories as the locality definition. Our results are qualitatively similar
across all definitions. We do not have enough information to identify the exact residential address
or the address of the property purchased with the mortgage, and can’t therefore build a geograph-
ical distance variable. We could however consider geographical distance from different SLAs or
different postcodes.
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where (α, β′, γ′, δ′)′ is an unknown coefficient vector; X contains market control
variables; W includes borrowers’ characteristics variables; Z includes specific in-
vestor buyer sophistication variables; and Λ(.) is the cumulative density function
(cdf ) of a logistic distributed random variable.
The variable of interest to address H1 included in W , which proxy for mobility
and familiarity, are the time in years a residential property investor (RIPL) has
spent living in her/his current address and employed in her/his current employment.
We expect a statistically significant negative sign for the coefficients of these two
proxies for mobility, as the probability of investing non-locally should be smaller
the less mobile residential investors are, or the more years they have lived at the
current address and worked at their current employment. A negative statistically
significant relationship between mobility and non-local investment would support
the familiarity bias explanation.
The variables of interest included in W to test H2 which proxy for financial
sophistication are the following: whether the investor holds shares and the value
held in shares; whether the investor already received rent income at the time of
applying for an investment property loan; and whether they held a previous mort-
gage, and its size. We expect investors purchasing a property who already receive
rent/board income to be real estate investors and have experience in the housing
market. Similarly, those who have held a prior mortgage have experience in the
mortgage market and are more sophisticated at the time of financing their invest-
ment with a mortgage. Real estate investors who also hold shares exhibit relative
diversification, and therefore more sophistication. Previous work use the level of
educational attainment or the occupation as a financial literacy proxy; see XXX
We do not have information on borrower’s educational level but can control for cer-
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tain property investors’ occupations, such as professionals, managers, small business
proprietors and self-employed.
In studies of behavioural bias and investor characteristics, proxies for investor
sophistication are found to attenuate the size of biases. Calvet et al. (2009) document
an inverse relationship between ‘financial mistakes’ and financial wealth, education
and, to a lesser degree, disposable income. This follows work by Dhar and Zhu (2006)
that links investor wealth, income and professional employment with less biased
investment decisions. They argue that in addition to the expected greater financial
literacy of these individuals, they are also more likely to access professional outside
financial advice. As another proxy for investment sophistication we have built a
dummy variable that identifies whether residential investors invest in properties
above the all-property median property price for the given SLA.
To test H3, we construct a variable that compares changes in property price
indexes at each SLA. We define out-performance in an SLA’s housing market if we
observe the SLA’s property price index change is in the highest 50 percent of all
SLAs across a state. We measure the index changes at lags of 3-, 6-, 12-, 24- and
36-months. Our Indicator variables equal Ik = 1 if the SLA return (measured as
change in median all-property index price) over the prior k months is above the
state-wide median SLA return (that is, in the top half of SLAs by return), at the
k = 3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 months.
4 Data background
The primary data used in this study is sourced from a major bank in the Australian
mortgage market. The dataset comprises 1,149,484 residential mortgage applica-
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tions from owner-occupiers and property investors for the period 1 January 2003
to 31 May 2009.7 Of this sample, property investors account for approximately 21
percent of all observations. ABS reports that total housing investment in autho-
rised deposit institutions (ADIs) represented 26 percent of all residential housing
purchases during the sample period.8 Figure 1(a) shows the proportion of residen-
tial real estate investors in our sample over time, representing around one third
of all mortgage applicants; seasonality, particularly financial-year tax effects, seems
prominent. The bank has provided extensive information it collects on borrower and
loan characteristics in the mortgage application process which will be incorporated
into our analysis.9
Although the sample period is somewhat outdated, it fits the research needs
as it excludes periods when investors’ access to mortgages was treated differently
to other individuals’ access to housing finance. From the early 2000s investor and
homeowner mortgages were treated the same, and the interest rates offered by banks
were not differentiated based on the loan purpose. However, between December 2014
and July 2018 the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) introduced
lending restrictions on investor mortgage loans; APRA put in place a 10 percent
cap on real estate investor lending growth, and had the authority to intervene if
an individual bank exceeded 10 percent growth in investor lending over a 12-month
period.10 Before that time, banks also developed stricter underwriting standards
7Unfortunately this dataset can not be updated due to data restrictions from the source bank.
8ABS, Housing Finance, Australia, August 2018, 5609 Table 12, http://www.abs.gov.au/
AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5609.0August%202018?OpenDocument.
9A detailed description of the institutional setting for housing loans in Australia and this dataset
is provided in Dungey et al. (2018).
10Additional macro-prudential measures were enacted in April 2017 which capped interest-only
lending at 30 percent of all new loans issued. Real estate investors purchasing property with a
mortgage in Australia have incentives to select interest-only loans due to the negative gearing tax
scheme.
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Figure 1: RIPLs over time.
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for investor loans, raised investor interest rates and required bigger deposits (lower
LTVs).
During the sample period 70 percent of Australian owned a property, and over
half of them were still paying a mortgage.11 Banks held on average 79 percent
of all monthly housing finance commitmments in Australia (and 81 percent of the
monthly value of all housing finance commitments).12 The Australian mortgage
market exhibits concentration around a few major domestic banks, and our data is
sourced from one of this major banks.
Table 1 present summary statistics for residential real estate investors financing
their investment with a mortgage, discerning those buying a residential dwelling
locally and those purchasing non-locally, using the definition presented in Section 3.
Residential real estate investors investing in a different SLA to the one they reside
in represent almost a third of the sample. Figure 1(b) shows how preference for non-
local properties has trended higher over the sample. Though most properties are
purchased in the home market, the non-local proportion has increased from below
30 percent early in the sample, to around 34 percent at the end of the sample period.
Table 1 shows that those investors investing non-locally are slightly younger than
those investors investing locally. There are lower proportions of married investors
and investors applying for credit with a coborrower when buying non-locally than
locally. Non-local residential investors also tend to have less dependants. There is
a larger proportion of female investors buying non-locally than locally. Residential
investors buying non-locally tend to have spent less time on average on their current
address and their current employment.
11See ABS, Housing Occupancy and Costs, Australia, 4130. http://www.abs.gov.au/
AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4130.02015-16?OpenDocument.
12See ABS, Housing Finance, Australia, 5609, Table 3. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/
abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5609.0July%202018?OpenDocument.
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By construct in our definition of a local purchase, local investors purchase prop-
erty in the same state where they reside, and all non-local investors purchase a
property in a different postcode to the one they reside in at the time of accessing
housing finance. Interestingly, local investors take slightly larger housing loans than
non-local investors, suggesting that those residential investors that invest further
away follow similar house prices. This is also observed for property valuation, as
those properties in further SLAs have lower value than the ones on the same SLA
of residence. Although average monthly repayments don’t differ much between in-
vestors, investors purchasing non-locally have higher average total loan payments
and higher average monthly expenses. However, non-local investors have higher
average income, larger asset value and net wealth position, consistent with our ex-
pected results under H2.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for mortgage borrowers
RIPL
Local Non− local
Total obs. 160,306 75,972
Proportions 67.8% 32.2%
Borrower characteristics
Age 43.6yrs. 42.4yrs.
Females 26.4% 27.6%
Married 74.3% 66.9%
Co-borrower 65.5% 54.4%
Number of dependents 0.7 0.6
Years at current address 7.6yrs. 6.7yrs.
Years at current employment 8.4yrs. 7.5yrs.
Sophistication
Table 10 in Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
RIPL
Locals Non− locals
Professionals 18.4% 23.6%
Management 17% 20.1%
Rent income 1.5% 1.9%
Hold shares 6.1% 5.9%
Property location
Interstate 0% 31.9%
Inter-postcode 24.2% 100%
Financial characteristics
Monthly net income $9,301 $10,059
Total net wealth $1,006,079 $1,083,109
Table 10 in Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.
To measure price performance of different localities, we use monthly aggregated
index data supplied by CoreLogic accessed through Sirca.
5 Results
5.1 H1: Familiarity bias
Some real estate investors may choose to invest in residential real estate geographi-
cally close to their place of residence as they may be more familiar with the area and
the neighbourhood. They have more knowledge on the developments of the region
and the local trends. They may find lower administration and maintenance cost
associated with owning an investment property close to their home. But this famil-
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iarity may obstruct these investors from learning about other real estate markets,
and exploring beneficial diversification. It is, after all, quite unlikely that the ‘home’
market always outperforms other markets (nationwide). We proxy familiarity with
the time spent at current address and current employment and test H1.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating eq(1) to test H1. The table shows
the explanatory variables on the first column, and four models that specify the
probability of investing in a residential property non-locally (at a different SLA
to the purchaser’s SLA of residence) with a mortgage following eq(1). Model (1)
focuses on W control variables, model (2) adds X and Z control variables, while
models (3) and (4) add to model (1) State or SLA and year dummies.
The main variables of interest to test H1 included in W are the residential in-
vestor’s time spent at the current address and current employment, measured in
years. The coefficients for these proxies for mobility are always negative and statis-
tical significant, showing that residential investors financing their investment with
a mortgage are 1-2 percent less likely to purchase a property located in a different
SLA to the SLA where they reside if they have spent longer time residing at their
current address and working at their current employment. This result strongly sup-
ports our first hypothesis H1, and suggests that the more familiar investors are with
their local market, the more likely they are to invest locally.
Results in Table 2 also show that residential property investors with a higher
number of dependants and applying with a co-borrower – suggesting more ‘settled’
households – are less likely to purchase non-locally. Supporting our last familiarity
and mobility result.
Mortgage borrowers with higher net income are more than 10 percent likely to
purchase non-locally, while those with higher net wealth are less likely to purchase
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non-locally. Females, who represent 26.8 percent of all residential real estate in-
vestors mortgage borrowers, are not statistically different from male residential real
estate investors.
Market variables are not statistically significant in most cases, and they don’t
have a strong economic significance either; this may be due to the fact that they
are all relevant at a national level, but not so much at the SLA level. Model (4)
controls for differences between SLAs incorporating SLA dummies.
Table 2: Logit Marginal Effects
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years at current -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
address [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years at current -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
employment [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly net 0.113∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
income (logarithm) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Net wealth -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(logarithm) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age < 30 years 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
30 ≤ Age < 40 years 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
50 ≤ Age < 60 years 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Age ≥ 60 years 0.049∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Female 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.001
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used. All monetary
variables are in logarithms and deflated by CPI of the corresponding SLA
state capital city for Q1-2006.
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Co-borrower -0.112∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Number of -0.023∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
dependants [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Interbank -0.003∗
rate [0.002]
Unemployment 0.000
rate [0.001]
%∆Dwelling -0.000
index [0.000]
State dummies NO NO YES NO
SLA dummies NO NO NO YES
Year dummies NO NO YES YES
Adj. R2 0.0251 0.0224 0.0303 0.0559
N 232,145 212,352 232,145 232,145
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used. All monetary
variables are in logarithms and deflated by CPI of the corresponding SLA
state capital city for Q1-2006.
5.2 H2 Sophisticated investors
H2 hypothesis posits that sophisticated investors will want to access diversification
gains, and then be less affected by home bias. In addition, obtaining information
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from non-local markets may be less costly for sophisticated investors, and they may
hold a stronger bargaining power due to their financial experience.
Table 3 shows the results that test H2, following the methodology explained in
Section 3. The first column in the table shows the control variables added in each
model. The models in the rest of the columns replicate the estimations in model (3)
of Table 2, and adds new exogenous variables to control for investor sophistication.13
Model (A) adds some control variables that may proxy for sophistication, such
as: whether the residential property investor held a prior mortgage, holds shares,
and already receives rent/board income. If a residential property investor held a
prior mortgage and/or already receives rent/board income it suggests she/he has
previous financial experience with mortgage and real estate markets, and presumably
is more savvy in terms of considering mortgage costs, property and capital gain taxes,
and rent, sell, and maintenance costs. Similarly, holding shares suggests property
investors are more financially diversified and sophisticated.
Model (B) considers investor’s selected occupations that may be related to finan-
cial knowledge and experience such as: professionals, management positions, small
business proprietors, and self-employed. We have included some occupations where
we expect lower financial sophistication, such as professional skilled trades and un-
skilled trades. Although not a perfect proxy, we expect property investors with
higher education – reflected in whether they are professionals or not – and those
with management experience, whether employed by other businesses or managing
their own businesses, to have higher financial sophistication. We acknowledge that
many professionals, managers and business owners may not have financial education
13As presented in Table 2, W includes the years at current address and employment, monthly
net income and net wealth (in logarithmic form), age brackets, female dummy, co-borrower dummy
and number of dependants.
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or experience, which means that we would be underestimating the effect of financial
education and sophistication using these proxies.
Finally, in model (C) we add a control variable that identifies whether the pur-
chase price of the investment residential property financed with a mortgage was
above the median SLA house price. This last exogenous variable controls for those
residential investors that can afford to purchase expensive properties in any market,
and are not investing in non-local markets due to affordability constraints.
Table 3: Logit Marginal Effects
P (non− locals) = 1
(A) (B) (C)
Held a prior -0.029∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
mortgage [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Hold shares 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Receive rent 0.042∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
income [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Professionals 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003]
Management 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
positions [0.003] [0.003]
Skilled trade -0.058∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004]
Unskilled -0.074∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
trade [0.005] [0.005]
Small business -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
proprietors [0.004] [0.003]
Self-employed -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.21
Table 3 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(A) (B) (C)
[0.003] [0.003]
Purchased above 0.023∗∗∗
the median house price [0.002]
Wi controls YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.0308 0.0353 0.0357
N 231,774 231,774 231,774
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.
As evidenced in Table 3, most proxies used for residential property investor
sophistication increase the likelihood of investing non-locally. These results support
the conjecture that more sophisticated investors are more likely to invest non-locally
than less sophisticated investors.
Investors who hold shares are 1.8 percent more likely to purchase a residential
investment property non-locally relative to the average residential property investor.
Investors who already receive rent/board income, and presumably have other real
estate investment, are 5 percent more likely to invest in real estate at a different
SLA to their current residence SLA. We find however that investors who already
held a prior mortgage, and have experience in the mortgage market, are less likely
to invest non-locally.
Residential property investors who are professionals or hold management posi-
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tions are more likely to invest non-locally, while residential property investors who
work in the skilled or unskilled trade industry, or who are self-employed or a small
business proprietor are more likely to invest locally. Moreover, investors who pay
above the median house price for the investment property they are purchasing, and
therefore can afford the top market, are 2.3 percent more likely to invest non-locally.
These findings relating to investor sophistication proxies are consistent with
Campbell (2006), who comments that investment mistakes are more commonly made
by less wealthy and less well educated individuals. He argues that as a result, less
sophisticated investors come to know their limits and avoid more complex or so-
phisticated investment situations. Graham et al. (2009) apply this argument to
the home bias in equity market investing, finding that investor’s own perception of
competence limits their likelihood to invest non-locally. Our results provide further
evidence to support this argument.
5.3 H3 out-performing markets
Lastly, H3 posits that residential property investors are less likely to purchase non-
locally when their home market has outperformed other markets.
Table 4 tests H3 by considering the market performance of the investors’ current
SLA of residence, i.e. their home market. For consistency with our definition of
local and non-local purchases, we use CoreLogic price index data aggregated to the
SLA level in this analysis.14 The estimation uses the same control variables as in
model (B) of Table 3,15 however we add a new exogenous dummy variable that
14Consistent results are observed using other geographical definitions such as postcode.
15That is, estimation results not reported in Table 4 include W variables– the years at cur-
rent address and current employment, monthly net income and net wealth (in logarithmic form),
age brackets, female dummy, co-borrower dummy and number of dependents – and Z variables –
whether investors held a prior mortgage, hold shares, receive rent income, professionals, manage-
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identifies outperforming markets. The new variable in X in eq(1) is now included
and reported in the estimation results presented in Table 4. Above median growth is
a dummy that takes the value of one if the house price growth (measured as change
in all-property median index price) in the SLA where the investor resides – their
home market – over the prior k (k = 3, 6, 12, 24, 36) months is above the state-wide
all-property median SLA house price growth – that is, the price growth in the home
market is in the top half of all state’s SLAs.
Table 4: Logit Marginal Effects
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Above median growth -0.005∗
(3 months, home market) [0.002]
Above median growth -0.013∗∗∗
(6 months, home market) [0.002]
Above median growth -0.020∗∗∗
(12 months, home market) [0.002]
Above median growth -0.030∗∗∗
(24 months, home market) [0.002]
Above median growth -0.039∗∗∗
(36 months, home market) [0.002]
Zi controls YES YES YES YES YES
Wi controls YES YES YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
AdjR2 0.0344 0.0345 0.0348 0.0352 0.0358
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in Appendix B
provides the definition for all variables used.ment positions, small business proprietor, self-employed, professional skilled trade, and unskilled
trade.
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N 206,821 206,821 206,821 206,821 206,821
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in Appendix B
provides the definition for all variables used.
Table 4 shows that investors whose home market (current SLA market of res-
idence) outperforms half the state market are more likely to invest locally. For
example, in an environment where the home market house prices has had relatively
strong price growth over the preceding 12 months, investors are 2 percent less likely
to invest non-locally, and therefore more likely to invest in the same area as their
current residence.
This finding runs contrary to our expectation in H3. Rather than using their
relatively strong purchasing power to invest non-locally following strong property
prices in their home areas, investors follow their home market’s trend. This result
may be indicative of momentum chasing. If investors want to chase a rising market,
they would have more familiarity of strong price appreciation in their home market,
supporting local preference.
Interestingly, this effect is stronger when performance is measured at longer
time intervals. The marginal effects considering prior 24 months price appreciation
in home market indicates a near-doubling of the likelihood that investors will choose
the home market following home market outperformance.
As a further robustness test of the relative purchasing power hypothesis, we
consider the price performance of the non-local market (that is, the market into
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which the investors buy). To do this we add an analogous Above median growth
dummy variable for the ”buy” market. The results from this analysis provide fur-
ther support for a momentum-chasing effect. The home market coefficient estimate
remains negative and statistically significant, while the buy market coefficient es-
timate is positive and, at performance measurement periods greater than or equal
to 12 months, statistically significant. For brevity the full results are presented in
Table 9 in Appendix A.
6 Additional Analysis
6.1 Price deviations
To further explore residential real estate investments locally and non-locally, we
calculate the relative deviation between the real estate investment purchase price
and the median house sale price in the SLA where that property is located.16 Table
5 shows the all-Australian average relative price deviation between each individual
property price and the SLA median purchase price for non-local and local investors.
Non-local investors tend to pay on average 8.9 percent above the median SLA pur-
chase price, while local investors pay on average 18.7 percent above median prices.
This difference may be due to quality factors in the properties purchased but most
likely also reflect that local investors tend to purchase properties in the top-end
of the price distribution; consistent with results obtained in Section 5.3. Figure 2
shows the Australian average price deviation between local and non-local investors
16The dataset contains informations on the sale price of the property purchased with the mort-
gage contracted as well as a valuation of the property secured with the mortgage. The sale price
variable is an incomplete variable though, so when sale price is not available we used the valuation
of the property.
26
over time.
Table 5: Average monthly median price deviations.
Non Locals Locals difference S.E. t-test
8.89% 18.72% 9.83% 0.33% 29.57
.
Figure 2: .
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We are interested in observing whether non-local investors tend to pay a pre-
mium on the properties they purchase relative to local investors. We calculate
the difference between the average purchase price local investors pay and the av-
erage purchase price non-local investors pay per SLA per month. We observe that
non-local investors tend to pay $12,564 less than local investors on average for a par-
ticular SLA on the same month (with a median price difference of $10,193 ). More
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generally, on average local investors seem to be paying a 3.1 percent premium over
non-local investors; the histogram is presented in Figure 3. As suggested above it
could be the case that local and non-local investors target different qualities in their
investments, and that can account for the price differential. Although we can’t con-
trol for quality differences in properties, we believe much of this differential is due to
non-local investors being more sophisticated and experienced. These results support
the results found in Section 5, and suggest that local investors exhibit momentum
chasing, and home bias due to familiarity and lack of sophistication.
Figure 3: Histogram of purchase price premium between local and non-local in-
vestors.
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6.2 Owner-occupiers vs. Investors
As we showed in Section 5, familiarity bias, lack of sophistication – including infor-
mation asymmetry and bargaining power – and momentum chasing can explain the
preference for residential real estate investment in the local area of residence. We
now explore these conclusions for the whole sample of residential real estate pur-
chasers, not only investors. We expect to find similar and even stronger results for
residential real estate purchasers, particularly owner-occupiers. That is, we expect
to find that buyers of residential property are more likely to purchase properties
that are geographically close over properties that are geographically distant. We
specifically test whether owner-occupiers demonstrate a stronger home bias than
property investors.
To explore this new conjecture, we follow eq(1), for the whole sample of prop-
erty purchasers with a mortgage. The variable of interest included in W is whether
the mortgage applicant is a residential property investor (RIPL) or not, where
RIPL = 1 if the mortgage applicant takes a residential property investment loan,
and RIPL = 0 otherwise. We expect a statistically significant positive sign for the
coefficient of RIPL, as the probability of investing non-locally should be greater for
residential investors, relative to owner-occupiers. Results are presented in Table 6,
while summary statistics for all the sample are presented in the Appendix in Table
2(b).
Table 6: Logit Marginal Effects
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residential investment 0.136∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used. All monetary
variables are in logarithms and deflated by CPI of the corresponding SLA
state capital city for Q1-2006.
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
property loans (RIPL) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
First-time 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
home buyer [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years at current -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
address [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years at current -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
employment [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly net 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
income (logarithm) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Net wealth -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(logarithm) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age < 30 years 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
30 ≤ Age < 40 years 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
50 ≤ Age < 60 years 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age ≥ 60 years 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Female -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Co-borrower -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Number of -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
dependants [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Held a previous -0.028∗∗∗
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used. All monetary
variables are in logarithms and deflated by CPI of the corresponding SLA
state capital city for Q1-2006.
30
Table 6 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mortgage [0.000]
Hold shares 0.016∗∗∗
[0.002]
Receive rent 0.043∗∗∗
income [0.002]
Professionals 0.019∗∗∗
[0.001]
Management 0.012∗∗∗
positions [0.001]
Skilled Trade -0.034∗∗∗
[0.001]
Unskilled Trade -0.054∗∗∗
[0.001]
Small business 0.002
Proprietors [0.001]
Self-employed -0.012∗∗∗
[0.001]
State dummies NO YES NO YES
SLA dummies NO NO YES NO
Year dummies NO YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.0972 0.0996 0.1140 0.1041
N 1,130,263 1,130,263 1,130,263 1,129,019
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in
Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used. All monetary
variables are in logarithms and deflated by CPI of the corresponding SLA
state capital city for Q1-2006.
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By analysing all property purchases financed with a mortgage, including owner-
occupiers and investors, we acknowledge the possible effect of confounding factors
in the owner-occupiers property purchase decision on our analysis. That is, owner-
occupiers are more likely than property investors to buy and reside in a similar
location to existing property due to lifestyle preferences – such as schools, work,
family and social connections, and also because that is the area in which they have
been hedged to price returns (assuming current property price change has a closer
relationship to price changes of properties in similar locations compared to properties
further away).
We are aware that our empirical exercise may suffer from selection bias, and pos-
sibly endogeneity. As our sample includes only all individuals who have successfully
applied for a mortgage to purchase a residential property with one of the major
Australian banks, we can’t account for those individuals purchasing property non-
locally financed with a mortgage from different financial institutions or by any other
mean. Nor can we include other non-local investors who have chosen not to invest
in residential real estate but other type of assets. More importantly, non-RIPL may
choose to purchase property locally or not based on non-capital gain considerations,
such as choosing a neighbourhood based on labour market, educational supply, and
other social and community considerations. Moreover, there may exist some com-
mon factors (omitted variables) that determine both whether an individual becomes
a residential property investor and whether real estate purchasers buy non-locally,
however these are not so evident to us. For the reasons described above we check
our results applying propensity score matching (PSM).
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The basic idea behind PSM17 is to define a group of non-RIPL who are similar to
RIPL in all relevant characteristics X, W , and Z, and calculate their probability of
purchasing residential property non-locally. In this way, differences in whether they
purchase locally or non-locally between the selected control and treatment groups
can be attributed to choosing a residential property investment loan. Specifically,
The PSM estimator for the average treatment effect (ATT) is written generally as:
τPSMATT = EP (X)‖D=1{E[Y (1)‖D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y (0)‖D = 0, P (X)]}
where Y (D) are the potential outcomes – in our case purchasing residential property
non-locally yi, with a treatment indicator variable D that equals 1 (in our case
RIPL = 1) if the mortgage applicant is an investor in residential real estate, and
equals 0 otherwise. And P(X) is the propensity score based on the probability for
an individual to be a residential property investor given the observed covariates X
(in our case X, W , and Z in eq(1)). The control group in our case are all non-RIPL
mortgage borrowers.18 All variables included in the PSM analysis are measured
before contracting a mortgage loan to purchase the property, and therefore are
expected not to be affected by whether borrowers are residential real estate investors
or not and whether they are purchasing locally or non-locally. We use a logit model
to estimate the propensity scores then used in the matching approach.
Table 7 shows the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) when comparing
the treated (RIPL) and control (non-RIPL) groups considering non-local residential
property investment with a mortgage as the outcome. We have tested PSM using
17See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a clear explanation of the implementation of PSM.
18We could expand our robustness experiment to include a broader control group by finding
common covariates in a national survey such as the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA) survey; https://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/hilda.
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Table 7: Individual characteristics, by mortgage type.
PSM method ATT S.E. t-test
Nearest Neighbour (without replacement) 0.165 0.001 118.5
Nearest Neighbour (with replacement) 0.168 0.001 137.3
Nearest Neighbour caliper (5, 10, 100, 1000) 0.165 0.001 118.5
ATT refers to ’average treatment effect of the treated’.
the nearest-neighbour approach with and without replacement, and caliper matching
with replacement – with distance set at 5, 10, 100 and 1000 and always obtaining
the same result. As pointed out in Smith and Todd (2001), all PSM estimators
yield very similar results asymptotically; with the large sample size they all become
closer to comparing only exact matches.
The robustness exercise confirms that RIPLs are 16 percent more likely to pur-
chase residential property non-locally than non RIPLs.
7 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In this paper we analyse the preference for local investment in a limitedly explored
setting: residential real estate. This setting provides unique insights, given the
breadth of access across demographic groups and other known inefficiencies. It also
warrants exploration in the context of investment concentration, where regulators
have commented on the increase in systemic financial risks potentially created by
undiversified property investments.
We document a large home bias across property investors. Using a large and
detailed mortgage-application level database, we find that non-local property pur-
chases account for 15.8 percent of all purchases in the sample. After controlling
for a range of buyer characteristics and market and economic factors, we show that
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owner-occupiers are more disposed to home bias than investors. Investors are around
13 percent more likely to buy property in a different area to their current address.
The home bias among investors is partially mitigated through the investor’s level of
sophistication. Proxies for investor sophistication, such as prior investment knowl-
edge, wealth, and education, increase the likelihood that the investor will purchase
in a non-local market. Finally, we consider whether the relative price performance
of home and non-local markets influences the home bias. We argue that if an in-
vestor’s home market has outperformed, then they have higher purchasing power in
non-local markets. However, if their home market has underperformed, a rational
explanation for the home bias might be observed. Our results suggest the oppo-
site. Strong local price performance increases the home bias. Investors are observed
to prefer their home market when it has outperformed, and will prefer non-local
markets when their home market underperforms.
There are several areas of this study that we have yet to explore. An interesting
question that our findings raise is, does the home bias have a negative impact on
investors’ performance? If this phenomenon is driven by behavioural biases we would
expect underperformance. We may also consider the risks of home bias and investor
concentration, given the practical implications of this aspect of our research. Due
to current data limitations, we have not considered at the property purchase level
whether non-local buyers overpay (as in Clauretie and Thistle (2007)). We also
do not include property market forecasts that may drive demand, such as market
expectations for rental yield and housing approvals. These data are observed ex-
post, and ex-ante forecasts are unavailable for our sample period at the SLA level.
Importantly, this study does not consider tax effects. Though important in property
investment decisions, we do not expect that it would influence our work, as the
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largest tax considerations for investment property in Australia are set nationally,
not at different jurisdictional levels. However, this is a further area for future work
into the drivers of residential real estate investment.
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A Figures and Tables
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for mortgage borrowers
All RIPL
Local Non− local Locals Non− locals
Borrower characteristics
Age 42.1yrs. 41yrs. 43.6yrs. 42.4yrs.
Under 30 yrs. 12% 16% 8.9% 12.1%
Between 30-39 yrs. 32% 33.9% 28.3% 31.5%
Between 40-49 yrs. 31% 26% 32.8% 28.6%
Between 50-59 yrs. 19% 18% 23.4% 21.3%
60 yrs. and over 6% 6% 6.6% 6.5%
Females 30% 28.9% 26.4% 27.6%
Married 72% 63.1% 74.3% 66.9%
Co-borrower 70.% 58.7% 65.5% 54.4%
Number of dependents 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.6
First-time buyers 4% 8.6%
RIPL 16.6% 41.9%
Years at current address 7yrs. 6yrs. 7.6yrs. 6.7yrs.
Years at current employment 7.2yrs. 6.6yrs. 8.4yrs. 7.5yrs.
Employment characteristics
Professionals 14.8% 22.6% 18.4% 23.6%
Management 14.8% 19.1% 17% 20.1%
Skilled trade 13.5% 9.7% 11.7% 8.7%
Unskilled trade 8.4% 4.6% 5.5% 3.8%
Small business proprietor 9.9% 9.3% 14.3% 11%
Other occupation 38.6% 34.6% 33% 32.7%
Self-employed 20.6% 19.4% 29.1% 22.7%
Property characteristics
Table 10 in Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
All RIPL
Locals Non− locals Locals Non− locals
Interstate 0% 26.5% 0% 31.9%
Inter-postcode 14.3% 100% 24.2% 100%
Financial characteristics
Rent income 0.5% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9%
Rent/board monthly income $407 $1,061 $1,302 $1,681
Monthly net income $7,040 $8,738 $9,301 $10,059
Total assets $879,313 $1,174,646 $1,398,317 $1,545,456
Property Value $698,383 $1,049,003 $1,097,235 $1,287,177
Hold shares 4.4% 5.2% 6.1% 5.9%
Value of total shares $2,627 $4,213 $5,012 $5,734
Total net wealth $634,720 $840,323 $1,006,079 $1,083,109
Loan Size $206,467 $272,896 $303,253 $300,966
LTV 60% 66.2% 62.7% 66.8%
Total obs. 968,114 181,370 160,306 75,972
Proportions 84.2% 15.8% 67.8% 32.2%
Table 10 in Appendix B provides the definition for all variables used.
Table 8 present summary statistics for mortgage applicants discerning those buy-
ing a residential dwelling locally and those purchasing non-locally, using the defini-
tion presented in Section 3.
Table 8 shows that in the cross-section non-local buyers are more likely to be
male, single, younger, apply as a single applicant, and have fewer dependants than
those buying locally. There are proportionally more first-time home buyers pur-
chasing non-locally than buying locally (which may be driven by affordability con-
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straints). Moreover, there are proportionally more borrowers applying for a residen-
tial investment property loan who buy non-locally than those residential investors
buying locally. In particular, of those who buy a residential dwelling in a different
SLA to their current neighbourhood 42 percent are residential investors – see Figure
??(a), while of those who purchase a property in the same SLA where they reside
only 17 percent are residential investors.
Additionally, those buying locally have spent, on average, longer time at their
current address and at their current employment than those buying non-locally,
suggesting lower mobility and indicative of home bias due to familiarity, as conjec-
tured in hypothesis H2. Interestingly, there is a larger proportion of professionals
and management workers that purchase non-locally relative to those purchasing
dwellings locally; the opposite is true for skilled trade and unskilled trade occu-
pations and self-employed mortgage applicants.19 Moreover, 26.5 percent of those
buying non-locally are purchasing property in a different state.
Table 9: Logit Marginal Effects
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Above median growth -0.013
(3 months, buy market) [0.013]
Above median growth -0.013
(3 months, home market) [0.013]
Above median growth 0.006
(6 months, buy market) [0.013]
Above median growth -0.066∗∗∗
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in Appendix B
provides the definition for all variables used.
19Self-employed category is a distinct category from the occupation categories and can overlap
with some of them.
42
Table 9 – continued from previous page
P (non− locals) = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(6 months, home market) [0.013]
Above median growth 0.105∗∗∗
(12 months, buy market) [0.013]
Above median growth -0.169∗∗∗
(12 months, home market) [0.013]
Above median growth 0.163∗∗∗
(24 months, buy market) [0.013]
Above median growth -0.257∗∗∗
(24 months, home market) [0.013]
Above median growth 0.268∗∗∗
(36 months, buy market) [0.014]
Above median growth -0.377∗∗∗
(36 months, home market) [0.014]
cons -3.469∗∗∗ -3.438∗∗∗ -3.442∗∗∗ -3.412∗∗∗ -3.401∗∗∗
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Financ. Sophist. YES YES YES YES YES
Wi controls YES YES YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
AdjR2 0.0344 0.0345 0.0350 0.0358 0.0374
N 206,821 206,821 206,821 206,821 206,821
[Standard errors]. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Table 10 in Appendix B
provides the definition for all variables used.
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B Variables
Table 10: Definitions for Variables
Variable Description
Non-locals Dummy for applicant’s residence (SLA4) different to prop-
erty’s location (SLA4).
RIPL Residential Investment Property Loan. The base are all other
loans (mainly owner occupiers).
FHB Dummy for first-time home buyer main borrower. The base is
a repeat-buyer.
Time at current address Time spent in years at the current residential address as re-
ported by the main borrower at application time.
Time at current employ-
ment
Time spent in years at the current employment as reported by
the main borrower at application time.
log(Net wealth) Logarithm of real surplus/net wealth at application, deflated
by corresponding capital city CPI 2006 Q1. Difference between
real total assets and real total liabilities.
log(Net monthly income) Logarithm of net monthly income for main applicant, deflated
by corresponding capital city CPI 2006 Q1. Income from part-
time and overtime work and commission, interest/dividends,
rent received, government benefits or pensions, and other
monthly income.
log(Total value of shares) Stock of real value of shares at application, deflated by corre-
sponding capital city CPI 2006 Q1. Zeros for no owned shares.
Shares Dummy for borrowers who hold shares in their asset portfolios.
Rent income Dummy for borrowers who receive rent income as part of their
income.
Government benefits in-
come
Dummy for borrowers who receive government benefits income
as part of their income.
Note. Observations falling into a particular quarter are matched to the relevant quarterly data.
All monetary values are expressed in 2006Q1 AUD $.
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Table 10 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
Prior Mortgage Dummy for the presence of a prior mortgage. Base is no prior
mortgage.
log(Total value of proper-
ties)
Logarithm of real value of properties in portfolio at application,
deflated by corresponding capital city CPI 2006 Q1. Zeros for
no owned shares.
LTV Loan-to-value ratio (%).
Age < 30 yrs., Age 30-39
yrs., Age 50-59 yrs., Age
≥ 60 yrs.
Dummies for borrower age group. The base is a borrower be-
tween 40-49 years old.
Female Dummy for female main borrower. The base is a male bor-
rower.
Co-borrower Dummy for applications with joint borrowers.
Number of dependents Number of dependents as reported by main borrower. Depen-
dent may be children or older adults.
Occupation dummies Dummies indicating occupation categories as follows: Profes-
sional, Management, Service, Office, Skilled Trade, Unskilled
trade, Agriculture, Retired, Unemployed and Small business
proprietor.
Self-employed Dummy for self-employed main borrower. The base is an em-
ployee borrower.
Married Dummy for married, or under de-facto relationship, main bor-
rower. The base is a single borrower.
Interbank rate (RBA) Monthly interbank rate reported by the RBA, F1 Interest
Rates and Yields - Money Market.
Unemployment rate Monthly unemployment rate by corresponding capital city re-
ported by the ABS, Cat. No.6202.0 G7 Labour Force, unem-
ployed persons as a percentage of labour force.
Note. Observations falling into a particular quarter are matched to the relevant quarterly data.
All monetary values are expressed in 2006Q1 AUD $.
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Table 10 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
%∆ Dwelling Index Percentage change in the dwelling index reported by the
Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey on Consumer Sentiment.
This index tracks responses on ‘whether now is a good time to
buy a dwelling’.
Interstate Dummy for borrower’s whose current residential state is dif-
ferent to the state where the property under the mortgage
contract is located.
Inter-postcode Dummy for borrower’s whose current address postcode is dif-
ferent to the postcode of the property under the mortgage con-
tract.
Property Status Dummy variables for existing house, to-be-built house, new
house, or vacant land.
State dummies Regional dummies for Australian States and Territories: ACT,
NSW, QLD, SA, TAS, VIC, WA.
SLA dummies Dummies for the SLAs of the property under the mortgage
contract.
Note. Observations falling into a particular quarter are matched to the relevant quarterly data.
All monetary values are expressed in 2006Q1 AUD $.
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